Abstract
Introduction
The goal of a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is to detect malicious activities, or attacks, on the network. A misuse NIDS defines an attack via an attack signature, typically a regular expression that matches a pattern of the attack [18, 23] . Ideally, each time an ongoing activity matches an attack signature, the NIDS raises an alarm.
Conceptually, a NIDS signature corresponds to a single attack, a sequence of events that exploits a given vulnerability. In practice, however, a signature should match many equivalent attack forms, or attack instances. For example, the same attack can be split into TCP or IP packets in many different ways. Therefore, the reliability of a NIDS ultimately depends on its ability to detect any instance of a given attack. Unfortunately, researchers (and attackers) have successfully evaded many NIDS by mutating an attack instance that the NIDS recognizes into an instance that it misses. For example, to evade a NIDS that only uses a signature of ASCII characters, they used the URL encoding transformation that replaces the ASCII characters of a URL with their equivalent hexadecimal values [8, 29] .
To increase NIDS reliability, NIDS developers should test the NIDS against as many attack instances as possible. To generate many instances of the same attack, developers commonly use an attack mutation system [13, 17, 24, 25, 29] . Such a system usually has two components: a set of attack transformation rules, such as the URL encoding above, and a mutation algorithm. To use such a system for testing, a developer first constructs an exemplary instance of a given attack. Then, the developer feeds the exemplary instance to the mutation algorithm. The algorithm repeatedly applies the transformations according to some predetermined (or random) order and generates new instances of the attack for testing purposes.
Attack mutation systems have successfully uncovered vulnerabilities in various NIDS [13, 17, 21, 24, 29] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the fundamental question underlying NIDS testing is yet to be investigated. This question is the testing coverage question: which instances, out of all the instances that can be derived by the rules, does the mutation algorithm generate and which does it miss?
We address the coverage question: we develop a Φ-complete mutation algorithm. Given an exemplary attack instance and a set of transformations Φ, a mutation algorithm is Φ-complete if it can generate all the instances, up to a given length k, that are derived from the exemplary instance using the rules in Φ.
Two observations should be noted about a Φ-complete mutation algorithm. First, an algorithm that exhaustively applies the rules in all possible combination is not necessarily Φ-complete. The problem is that it is unclear when to stop the generation, because instances that are longer than k might eventually derive instances that are shorter than k.
Second, a Φ-complete algorithm does not necessarily generate all possible instances of a given attack. It can do so, theoretically at least, if we assert that the rules in Φ represent all possible ways to transform the attack. Nevertheless, the ability to prove that an algorithm is Φ-complete is the first step toward a mutation system that generates all possible instances of an attack. Having said so, however, determining whether a system contains all possible transformations is beyond the scope of this paper.
Achieving Φ-completeness. To achieve Φ-completeness, our algorithm requires that the rules in Φ are reversible and uniform. Reversibility means that each transformation in our system has a corresponding inverse. Uniformity means that if an attack instance σ derives an instance τ , then there exists a derivation from σ to τ in which we first simplify σ as much as possible and then complicate the result until we reach τ . We define "simplify" and "complicate" using a novel complexity metric for attack instances. For example, we say that an attack instance that contains HEX encoding is more complex than an instance that does not contain such encodings.
We show that when the rules in Φ are uniform and reversible, the instances that Φ derives can be derived from a few representative instances, called atoms. We prove that atoms split attack instances into equivalence classes: two instances are in the same class if and only if they are derived from the same atom. Using this property, we developed a two-phase mutation algorithm. Given an attack instance, we first automatically compute its atom; then, we generate all instances that are derivable from this atom.
We also develop the union property for preserving reversibility and uniformity of two sets of transformations. Given Φ 1 and Φ 2 , where each set is uniform and reversible, we show that if Φ 1 and Φ 2 are positively commutative (as defined Section 4.4), then Φ 1 ∪ Φ 2 is also uniform and reversible. Practically speaking, this property helps us prove the uniformity and reversibility of a large set of rules. For example, we develop one set of uniform and reversible rules for TCP and one for HTTP. We use the union property to show that the union of the two sets is uniform and reversible and therefore our algorithm is Φ-complete with respect to our TCP and HTTP rules.
Other usages of a Φ-complete algorithm. During NIDS development we usually encounter the forensics problem: given a set of rules, determine whether two attack instances are derived from each other. This problem arises when we need to determine whether a trace of packets is an instance of a known attack. As we show in Section 4, a Φ-complete algorithm can be used to assert whether two instances are derived from each other. When a Φ-complete algorithm asserts that two instances are not derived from each other, we know that only one of the two following options are possible. First, the instances are derived from each other but our algorithm does not use the transformations that were used to derive the instances. In this case, the algorithm helps us uncover a new transformation. Second, the instances are not derived from each other; in that case, the algorithm helps us define a new attack. Although the distinction between the two cases requires manual intervention, note that an incomplete algorithm is even less useful because it introduces a third case in which the instances are derivable from each other but the algorithm was not able to determine that fact.
We show that a Φ-complete algorithm can efficiently solve the forensics problem when the rules in Φ are uniform and reversible. Given two instances, σ and τ , the algorithm first computes the atom of σ and then checks whether τ can be derived from this atom. The correctness of this algorithm stems from the fact that two instances are derivable from each other if and only if they have the same atom.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. The notion of Φ-complete attack mutation algorithm.
Such an algorithm addresses the coverage question which is the core of any rigorous NIDS testing process.
2. Conditions for Φ-completeness. We develop the notion of uniformity and reversibility for attack transformations. We show how to use these concepts to prove that our proposed algorithm is Φ-complete. We also develop the union property that helps proving the uniformity of a union of two sets of transformations.
3.
A practical instance of a uniform and reversible set of transformations. We show that common attack transformations are uniform and reversible. Our set of rules include transformations like TCP-fragmentation, TCP-permutation, and TCP-retransmission as well as application-level transformation like the URL encoding.
Related Work
We review related work in the areas of attack transformations, NIDS testing, abstract reduction systems, and using uniform proofs in logic programming.
Attack transformations. Fundamentally, network attacks can be modified, or transformed, at any level of the protocol stack. Ptacek and Newsham [20, 21] as well as Handley and Paxson [10, 18] were the first to introduce IP and TCP transformations (e.g., fragmentation, packet reordering).
Based on their work, tools that use attack transformations for NIDS testing, or evasion, have been developed. Fragroute, which transforms TCP-based attacks [28] , and Whisker, which transforms HTTP attacks [22] , randomly combine transformations specified by the user. Mucus [17] uses attack transformations to perform cross-testing of two NIDS: it builds packets that match a signature of the first NIDS, transforms them, and checks whether the other NIDS identifies the modified packets. Recently, Vigna et al. [29] developed a tool that applies application-level transformations (e.g., HTTP encoding, injection of Telnet escape characters) in addition to TCP/IP transformations. Other testing tools that are based on attack transformations are Snot [27] , Stick [9] , and Thor [1, 13] .
The tools mentioned above successfully found attack instances that evade the NIDS they had tested. However, to the best of our knowledge, the researchers that developed these tools have not addressed the completeness question. Recently, Rubin et al. [24] developed a tool called AGENT that exhaustively applies transformation rules in all possible combinations. However, they did not provide formal proof that AGENT can really generate all possible instances. Indeed, as we argue in Section 4.1, exhaustiveness does not guarantee completeness.
Dacier et al. [7] use attack mutation to evaluate the potential of a set of different IDSs to handle a large set of transformations. However, unlike our work here, they did not investigate the completeness property of their system.
Reduction systems and uniform proofs. Our formal methodology is closely related to abstract reduction system [2] . A reduction system is a pair (A, →), where x → y is a binary relation such that x, y ∈ A. In our case, x and y are attack instances and the relation → is defined using transformation rules.
However, to the best of our knowledge, a classic reduction system does not distinguish between shrinking (i.e., simplifying) and expanding (i.e., complicating) rules. Hence, the general results for such systems cannot be used unmodified. For example, our concept of an atom (Section 4.2.2) is equivalent to the concept of a normal form in lambda calculus [3] : an element x that cannot be further reduced (i.e., there is no y such that x → y). However, an atom is an element that cannot be reduced using shrinking rules only, while a uniform form in lambda calculus cannot be reduced by any rule. Also note that every instance in our reduction system is strongly normalized with respect to our shrinking rules, that is every instance has an atom.
Miller et al. [15] describe uniform proofs where rightintroduction rules, which are analogous to shrinking rules (Section 4.2.1), appear before left-introduction rules, which are similar to expanding rules. The main intuition behind introducing uniform proofs was to capture goal-directed search. They also proved that in the framework of logic programming uniform proofs are complete, i.e., if a term is provable then it has an uniform proof. Uniform proofs have also been in explored in other contexts [11, 26] . Special structures of derivation also have also been used in securityprotocol verification [4, 5, 6, 14] . To our knowledge, our paper is the only work that explores uniform derivations as the basis for generating attack mutations for NIDS testing.
Technical Overview
We use an exemplary attack to demonstrate the fundamental concepts of attack mutation that we use later in the paper: transformations, mutation algorithm, atoms, and uniform derivation.
The perl-in-cgi exploit (CAN-1999-0509 [16] ): a Perl interpreter is installed in the cgi-bin directory on a Web server, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands.
Attack transformations. Consider an instance of perlin-cgi, denoted σ, that contains a single HTTP GET request: "GET <web page>/cgi-bin/perl.exe". Assume that σ uses a single TCP segment (not including the TCP handshake segments). Consider the following transformation rules that we can use to create other instances of perlin-cgi from σ:
if τ is obtained from σ by copying σ's segments, or TCP packets, and then fragmenting a single segment into two segments, then τ is an instance of perl-in-cgi.
url
+ (URL encoding): if τ is obtained from σ by replacing a printable character in σ's URL with its hexadecimal ASCII value, then τ is an instance of perl-in-cgi.
http-pipe
+ (HTTP pipelining): if τ is obtained from σ by inserting a benign HTTP GET request (e.g., "GET <web page>/index.html") before the malicious GET request, then τ is an instance of perl-in-cgi.
Denote the set of the three rules as Φ 3 . We say that an instance τ is derivable from σ with respect to Φ 3 if τ is the result of applying a rule from Φ 3 on σ. Naturally, we extend the definition of derivability to a sequence of rule applications.
An attack mutation algorithm generates many instances of perl-in-cgi by repeatedly applying the rules in Φ 3 on the initial instance σ. We say that the algorithm is complete with respect to Φ 3 , denoted Φ 3 -complete, if it can generate all (up to a certain length k) instances that are derived from σ using the rules in Φ 3 . Notice that a Φ 3 -complete algorithm does not generate all possible instances of perlin-cgi, but only the instances that can be derived using the rules in Φ 3 . For example, a Φ 3 -complete algorithm will not generate instances that are based on other TCP transformations, such as TCP-retransmission. Expanding and shrinking transformations imply a partial order over the instances of perl-in-cgi. The length (in bytes) of an instance can be used to rank the instance complexity: the longer the instance the higher its complexity. Note that frag + , url + , and http-pipe + increase instance complexity, while frag -, url -, and http-pipe -reduce it. (frag + increases the complexity because each additional TCP segment requires an additional TCP header.) Atoms. Intuitively, the instance σ is atomic. First, we cannot shrink σ any further because it uses a single TCP segment, does not include benign HTTP requests, and contains only printable characters. Second, σ is the simplest form of the attack, any byte in σ is required for a successful attack. Third, with respect to our rules, σ is the building block of all other instances. Using expanding rules alone, σ derives any perl-in-cgi instance that is fragmented into several (non-overlapping) TCP segments, contains benign HTTP commands, and its URLs use either printable characters or their hexadecimal ASCII values.
A uniform derivation. In a uniform derivation all shrinking transformations precede all expanding ones. As we discuss in the next section, to prove that our proposed mutation algorithm is Φ 3 -complete, we need to show that if σ derives τ , then there is also a uniform derivation from σ to τ . For example, it is easy to see that if we first expand an instance by fragmenting it (i.e., using frag + ) and then replacing an hexadecimal ASCII value with a printable character (i.e., using url -), then it is possible to first replace the character and then to fragment the instance.
Summary of observations. Shrinking and expanding transformations correspond to our intuition that we can simplify or complicate attack instances. Atoms correspond to our intuition that some attack instances cannot be simplified any further and these instances are the building blocks for other attack instances. Uniformity corresponds to our intuition that it is possible to derive all instances from a given instance by first simplifying the instance as much as possible, using shrinking rules, and then only use expanding rules to generate all instances.
Achieving Φ-Completeness
Our goal in this section is to develop a Φ-complete attack mutation algorithm. To do so, we first formally define transformation rules, a mutation algorithm, and the notion of Φ-completeness (Section 4.1). We also discuss why, for a general set of rules, an algorithm that recursively applies the rules is unlikely to be Φ-complete. Next, we discuss the reversibility and uniformity of transformations (Section 4.2) and prove that our proposed algorithm is Φ-complete if Φ is reversible and uniform (Section 4.3). Last, we develop the union property that states the necessary conditions under which a union of two sets of rules is uniform and reversible.
Notice that the discussion in this section does not imply that every set of transformations is uniform and reversible. Our goal is just to reveal the properties necessary for proving Φ-completeness. While an arbitrary definition of transformations is unlikely to have these properties, we show that common TCP transformations (Section 5) and HTTP transformations (Section 6) can be defined such that they are indeed uniform and reversible.
An Attack Mutation Algorithm
In this section we model attack instances as strings over the alphabet Σ.
Let Σ be an alphabet set, Σ be the set of strings over Σ, and Σ k ⊆ Σ be the set of strings of length ≤ k. A transformation rule r has the following form:
where σ and σ are strings over Σ, and pre and post are predicates. The rule is interpreted as follows: if a string σ satisfies the predicate pre, then σ is derivable from σ provided that post (σ, σ ) is true. If a string σ can be derived from σ using a rule r, we write it as σ r → σ . Let Φ be a set of transformation rules. We say that a string σ is derivable from σ with respect to Φ, denoted σ Φ ⇒ σ , if and only if there exists a sequence of rules
Given a string σ and a set of rules Φ, the closure of σ with respect to Φ, denoted Cl Φ (σ), is the set of strings that
A mutation algorithm, denoted MA, takes a finite set of strings S ⊆ Σ and returns another set of strings MA(S) such that S ⊆ MA(S). Intuitively, a mutation algorithm takes a set of attack instances and returns a larger set of instances that are mutations of the original ones.
Definition 1 (A sound and complete mutation algorithm).
Let MA be a mutation algorithm, Φ a set of transformation rules, and S ⊆ Σ a set of strings.
• For practical applications, we would like to bound the number of instances that a mutation algorithm derives. Hence, our focus in the rest of this paper is on Φ k -complete algorithms. Furthermore, since a sound mutation algorithm is trivial to construct, we take soundness for granted and do not mention this property unless required.
To better understand the difficulty in constructing a Φ kcomplete mutation algorithm, consider a standard work-list algorithm that builds a closure by recursively deriving the successors of the initial instance σ. It is difficult to determine when to terminate such a derivation process. Suppose we derive an instance σ such that length(σ ) > k. Intuitively, since σ is too long to be included in Cl Φ (σ) ∩ Σ k , we would be inclined to believe that σ cannot derive any instance that is part of Cl Φ (σ) ∩ Σ k . However, in a general mutation system, each rule might have an arbitrary effect. So, even though σ is too long, it might derive a shorter instance that is part of the closure.
Uniformity and Reversibility
The difficulty in constructing a Φ k -complete algorithm suggests that such a system requires ordering of attack instances. The goal of uniformity and reversibility is to formalize the concepts of simplifying and complicating an attack instance.
Let be a partial order on the set Σ . We say that σ ≺ β if and only if σ β and σ = β.
Given a set of transformations Φ and a partial order , a rule r is called a shrinking rule if for all σ and σ such that σ r → σ we have that σ σ . A rule r is called an expanding rule if for all σ and σ such that σ r → σ we have that σ ≺ σ . Φ − and Φ + denote subsets of Φ consisting of shrinking and expanding rules in Φ, respectively. Intuitively, shrinking rules are used to simplify an attack instance while expanding rules are used to complicate it.
A derivation r 1 , . . . , r k is called uniform if there does not exist an i < j such that r i is an expanding rule and r j is a shrinking rule. Alternatively, in a uniform derivation, shrinking rules are applied before expanding rules. 
Definition 2 (Uniformity of Φ). Let
Two important observations should be noted. First, in a uniform and reversible set of transformations each shrinking rule is the inverse of an expanding rule, and vice-versa. We use this observation when we construct a Φ-complete algorithm (Section 4.3).
Second, as already mentioned in the beginning of this section, not every set of transformations is uniform and reversible. However, in Sections 5 and 6 we show that it is possible to define common transformations used by existing mutation systems such that they are uniform and reversible.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that for a partial order used by our mutation system any descending chain is finite. A chain of attack instances σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . is called descending if and only if σ i σ i+1 . This assumption states that shrinking rules cannot be applied infinitely, which corresponds to the fact that we cannot simplify an attack instance beyond a certain point. For example, the instance σ in Section 3 is the simplest form of the perl-in-cgi attack with respect to the rules we considered.
Computing Atoms
An atom is the simplest instance of an attack. We formalize this intuition using shrinking and expanding rules.
Given a partial order and a set of transformations Φ in which each rule is either expanding or shrinking with respect to , a string σ is called a Φ-atom if there does not exist a shrinking rule r in Φ such that σ r → σ : no shrinking rule from Φ can be applied to a Φ-atom. Given a string σ, the set atoms Φ (σ) is the set of Φ-atoms that are derived from σ. For a finite set of strings S, the set atoms Φ (S) is defined as ∪ σ∈S {atom Φ (σ)}. Theorem 1. Let Φ be a set of transformations. If Φ is uniform and reversible, then for every string σ, the set atoms Φ (σ) is a singleton set. Algorithm 1 shows how to compute atoms Φ (σ). Initially, the algorithm sets currentString to σ. Each time in the while loop, a shrinking rule r is applied to currentString. If a shrinking rule cannot be applied to currentString, the algorithm terminates. Claim 1. Let Φ be a set of transformations and σ be a string. If Φ is uniform and reversible then Algorithm 1 computes atoms Φ (σ).
Proof of Claim 1: Algorithm 1 computes only descending chains. Since we assume that any descending chain is finite (Section 4.2.1), the algorithm must terminate. It is clear that the algorithm computes an atom. Theorem 1 proves that for a uniform and reversible set of transformations, the set atoms Φ (σ) is a singleton set. Hence, the algorithm computes the set atoms Φ (σ).
A Φ k -Complete Mutation Algorithm
We show that if Φ is uniform and reversible then there exists a Φ-complete mutation algorithm.
Algorithm 2 presents a Φ-complete mutation algorithm when Φ is uniform and reversible. First, we compute atoms Φ (S) using Algorithm 1 (Lines 3-6) . Then, we apply expanding rules from Φ + to all sequences in atoms Φ (S) to generate additional sequences. Notice that when a sequence α is picked from the worklist, only its successor sequences that are of length ≤ k denoted Φ + ({α})∩Σ k , are generated. For instance-generation purposes, we assume that is length preserving: if α β then length(α) ≤ length(β). As we show in Sections 5 and 6, this assumption holds for common attack transformations.
Claim 2. Algorithm 2 terminates.

Proof of Claim 2:
We need to show that after a finite number of steps worklist is empty. First, notice that any new instance generated in Line 12, is added only once into worklist. This is because we add every newly generated instance to tests (Line 18) and we add an instance to worklist only if the instance is not found in tests (Line 14). Second, notice that the total number of different instances that are added into tests (Line 18) is bounded, because Σ k is finite. Therefore, the number of instances that are added to worklist is bounded. Third, notice that in each iteration of the while loop an instance is removed from worklist (Line 11). Also note that each instance that is removed must exist in tests, so it cannot be added again. We conclude that the size of worklist is bounded and each iteration removes an instance, therefore worklist must be emptied after a finite number of iterations.
Theorem 2.
Let Φ be a set of transformations and MA the mutation algorithm from Algorithm 2. If Φ is uniform and reversible according to a length preserving partial order, then MA is Φ k -complete and Φ-sound.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Soundness of Algorithm 2 follows from the fact that we only apply rules from Φ to generate test cases. To prove Φ k -completeness we need to show that for every σ ∈ S if σ Φ ⇒ σ and length(σ ) ≤ k then Algorithm 2 generates σ . More formally, we have to show that every sequence σ in the set Cl Φ (S) ∩ Σ k is generated by Algorithm 2.
Assume σ ∈ S and consider an arbitrary σ ∈ Cl Φ (σ) ∩ Σ k . Since we assume that Φ is uniform and reversible, there is a uniform derivation from σ to σ . Let the uniform derivation be of the following form:
Consider σ j , the last sequence obtained after applying shrinking rules. There are two cases:
1. σ j is an atom of σ, that is σ j ∈ atoms Φ (σ). σ will be generated by Algorithm 2 because (i) we start derivation from atoms Φ (σ) (Line 5), and (ii) since length(σ ) ≤ k and is length preserving, then σ j , . . . , σ j+m have length ≤ k. The fact that is length preserving is important because it ensures that the length of σ j . . . σ j+m is less than or equal to k and therefore the algorithm would generate all those instances, including σ . 
Note that since is length preserving the length of every instance in this derivation is ≤ k. Now, insert this derivation after σ j in the original derivation from σ to σ . We obtained a uniform derivation that passes through a sequence in atoms Φ (σ). 
Second, since Φ is uniform, we conclude that there exists a uniform derivation from σ A to σ B . Last, we follow the proof of Theorem 1 and show that such a uniform derivation does not exist unless either σ A or σ B is not an atom.
Combining Mutation Systems
For the purpose of attack mutation, it is usually convenient to have separate sets of rules for different network protocols. For example, a set for TCP transformations and a set for HTTP transformations. Such separation facilitates a modular testing process in which we test our NIDS first against TCP transformations, then against HTTP transformations, and last against attack instances that are derived using both TCP and HTTP transformations.
Theorem 2 proved that for Φ 1 and Φ 2 that are uniform and reversible, Algorithm 2 is Φ k 1 -complete and Φ k 2 -complete, respectively. However, this does not mean that Algorithm 2 is Φ k 3 -complete where
One way to prove that Algorithm 2 is Φ k 3 -complete is to prove, from scratch, the reversibility and uniformity of the transformations in Φ 3 . However, we show that this is not necessary when Φ 1 and Φ 2 are uniform and reversible with respect to the same partial order and are positively commutative. This result simplifies the completeness proof of complex mutation systems because it is usually easier to prove commutativity of two sets of rules rather than the uniformity of their union. 
Definition 4 (Positively Commutative Transformations
Theorem 3. Let R and S be two sets of transformations rules such that (i) R and S are reversible and uniform with respect to a partial order , and (ii) R and S are set-wise positively commutative. Then, Φ = R ∪ S is reversible and uniform with respect to .
Proof of Theorem 3:
It is clear that a union of transformation sets preserves reversibility. It is left to show that Φ is uniform: given a derivation σ
Let σ Φ ⇒ τ be a derivation from σ to τ . The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 4: we use the uniformity and commutativity of R and S to "shift" the shrinking rules to the beginning of the derivation from σ to τ .
First, we express σ Φ ⇒ τ in terms of subderivations that only use rules from either R or S (without lose of generality we assume the derivation starts with rules from R):
Second, since both R and S are uniform we express Derivation 1 using uniform subderivations:
Last, we prove by induction that Derivation 2 can be converted into the uniform derivation of the form:
We use theŜ instead of S, to indicate that the derivation might have been changed during the "shifting" process. Our induction is on the number of uniformity violations in Derivation 2. A uniformity violation is an occurrence of one of the following derivations: r + followed by s − or s + followed by r − . The induction is given in appendix B. 
Summary of Theoretical Results
We formulated attack transformations and their uniformity and reversibility. We proved that if Φ is a uniform and reversible set of transformations, then Algorithm 2 is Φ k -complete and Φ-sound (Theorem 2). We developed an algorithm to compute atoms (Algorithm 1) and showed that when Φ is uniform and reversible atoms Φ (σ) is a singleton set. We showed that when σ Φ ⇒ σ then atoms Φ (σ) = atoms Φ (σ ) (Claim 3). This observation immediately leads to an algorithm that, given a uniform and reversible Φ, solves the forensics problem (Algorithm 3). Last, we investigated the union property that ensures that a union of two sets of uniform and reversible transformations is also uniform and reversible.
In the next section, we show that, when carefully defined, common attack transformations are uniform and reversible.
Uniform and Reversible TCP Rules
We present a set of common TCP transformations that are reversible and uniform. To prove that our transformations are reversible and uniform, we first formally define the notion of a TCP sequence and the semantics of our transformations (Section 5.1). Next, we define a partial order over TCP streams, called complexity (Section 5.2). Last, we prove that our rules are reversible and uniform with respect to complexity (Section 5.3).
The reader should be advised that the proof of uniformity and reversibility is based on the semantics of our rules. In other words, we do not claim that all previous attack mutation systems that include these types of transformations define the transformations so they are reversible and uniform. The reader is encouraged to check that our semantics closely represents the nature of these transformations. Therefore, we believe that our rule definitions can be easily adopted by mutation systems with which we are familiar.
Semantics of TCP Transformations
A TCP sequence represents the communication between an attacker and a victim. A sequence is a list of segments, s 1 , . . . , s n , where each segment represents a single message that the attacker and victim exchange. Each segment The position of a segment in a sequence determines the time this segment is sent by the attacker: s i is sent only after s j have been sent for all j < i, and before s k for all k > i. For brevity, our TCP sequence definition only includes the segments sent by the attacker. Table 1 presents Φ tcp , a set of transformations in our TCP mutation system. The superscript + denotes expanding rules and the superscript − denotes shrinking rules. Formally, each rule has the form of
τ,post(σ,τ ) (Section 4.1). Several observations should be noted:
1. Our system includes TCP rules that fragment a TCP stream, deliver segments out-of-order, and add retransmitted segments. Table 1 informally describes each rule and provides an example of its effects. The formal semantics of the rules are presented in Appendix A.
2. Our TCP fragmentation rule can create overlapping TCP segments. This definition is broader than previous ones that define fragmentation as splitting (e.g., [21] ). It turns out that splitting alone is not enough for uniformity. The existence of retransmission with merging, or unsplitting, can create overlapping segments and the only way to simplify such segments is by defining de-fragmentation (i.e., frag − ) with overlapping.
3. There are cases in which fragmentation and retransmission have the same effect. For example, (1, bc) . However, each of the rules also has a unique effect. The retransmission rule always retransmits a substring of a segment, while the fragmentation rule can split a segment into two. 4. Our TCP retransmission rule retransmits the same data.
This means that if two segments overlap, they transmit the same payload in their overlapping parts. This definition of retransmission facilitates the uniformity proof. Section 8 discusses retransmission of different data.
A Partial Order for TCP Sequences
To show that Φ tcp (Table 1) is uniform, we must show that the rules in Φ tcp are either shrinking or expanding with respect to a partial order.
We order TCP sequences according to their complexity. We say that σ is more complex than τ if it delivers a longer payload, delivers the same payload but uses more segments, or delivers the same payload with the same number of segments but the segments in σ are more disordered (as we define below) than the segments in τ . 
We say that length(σ)<length(τ ) if and only if
The next component of complexity is the disorder level of a TCP sequence. The disorder level of σ counts the number of segment pairs that are sent out-of-order. For example, the disorder level of a sequence that sends segments ordered according to their sequence numbers is zero. Similarly, the disorder level of a sequence that sends the segments in their reverse order is Define complexity(σ) ≡ (length(σ), disorder(σ)).
1. We say that complexity(σ) = complexity(τ ) if and only if σ = τ .
2.
We say that complexity(σ) < complexity(τ ) if and only if (length(σ) < length(τ )) or (length(σ) = length(τ ) ∧ (disorder(σ)<disorder(τ )).
We say that σ is less complex than τ , denoted σ ≺ τ , if complexity(σ) < complexity(τ ).
Note that complexity is a partial order; it ranks sequence using length as the primary index and disorder as a secondary one. As required in Section 4.2.1, any descending chain of complexity is finite: we cannot simplify an attack instance infinitely simply because length is bounded by zero segments. Furthermore, complexity is length preserving as required by Theorem 2. The proof of Claim 5 is presented in Appendix B.
Uniformity Proof of Φ tcp
To prove that Φ tcp is uniform we prove that all the conditions of the following claim hold. 
Notice that for Φ tcp condition (i) holds because the rules in Φ tcp are based on string operations that are reversible (e.g., concatenation, permutation). Furthermore, condition (ii) holds because the rules in Φ tcp are either shrinking or expanding with respect to complexity (Claim 5).
Let σ be a TCP sequence. The reader is encouraged to check that for any overlapping between σ segments, and for any order of σ segments, if we repeatedly apply shrinking rules, we get a TCP sequence in which (i) all segments are ordered according to their sequence numbers (otherwise we could apply swap − ), (ii) each byte is transmitted exactly once (otherwise we could apply either frag − or ret − ), and (iii) we use the least number of TCP segments as possible (otherwise we could apply frag − ). Therefore, by repeatedly applying shrinking rules, we get an atom of σ, that is, condition (v) holds.
Consider σ and its σ A . σ A is the single atom of σ because our rules do not change the payload of the TCP sequence and according to the TCP specifications [19] , there is only a single way in which one can transmit a payload such that each byte is transmitted exactly once, in order, with the least number of segments. So, atoms Φtcp (σ) is a singleton set and condition (iv) holds.
Last, consider σ and τ such that σ Φtcp ⇒ τ . Since according to the TCP specifications the rules in Φ tcp do not alter the payload of a TCP sequence, if σ Φtcp ⇒ τ it means that both σ and τ transmits the same payload. Since both have a single atom and both atoms transmit the same payload, according to the TCP specification, the two atoms must be identical. So, condition (iii) holds.
We showed that for Φ tcp all the conditions in Claim 6 hold, so Φ tcp is uniform and reversible with respect to complexity.
Uniform and Reversible HTTP Rules
We illustrate a uniform and reversible set of transformations for the HTTP protocol. We illustrate two representative transformations: HTTP padding that pads an HTTP request with spaces (either before or after a URL) and HTTP encoding that encodes a URL using hexadecimal values. We chose these transformations because they have been successfully used to evade NIDS [24, 29] . Furthermore, these transformations represent other applicationlevel transformations that modify the attack payload. We further discuss other application-level transformations in Section 8.
We abstract an HTTP attack as a single string, for example, "GET /cgi-bin/perl.exe HTTP/1.1". To define an HTTP attack, we use a regular language that conforms to the HTTP specifications [8] , denoted L http :
where:
• L url defines a URL as a string over ASCII characters or their hexadecimal encodings. Formally, L url ⊆ {(ASCII ∪ h(ASCII)) * } where ASCII is the standard ASCII character set and h(ASCII) is a regular substitution [12] that maps an ASCII character to a string representing the character's hexadecimal encoding, for example h('a')="%61".
Name Pre Condition
Post Condition pad • SP stands for white-space characters.
• m ∈ {GET, POST}, these are the most common HTTP methods used in HTTP attacks. Table 2 presents our set of HTTP transformations, denoted Φ http . The rules pad 1 and pad 2 change the number of spaces between the attack components. The url rule, encodes a single ASCII character in the attack's URL into its hexadecimal encoding.
To proof the uniformity Φ http we show that all the conditions in Claim 6 hold: 3. The proofs that atoms Φhttp (σ) is a singleton set and that atoms Φhttp (σ) = atoms Φhttp (τ ) are similar to the proofs presented for Φ tcp (Section 5.3). In this case, however, the proofs are based on the HTTP specification [8] which states that there is only a single most-concise way to deliver an HTTP attack.
Combining Φ http with Φ tcp
We show that Φ http ∪ Φ tcp is uniform and reversible. We can do that by showing that the conditions of Claim 6 hold. However, this becomes more difficult as we add transformations to our system. For example, in the uniformity proof of Φ tcp (Section 5.3) we assumed that the rules do not change the attack payload, an assumption that is no longer true for the case of Φ http .
We illustrate a different method for proving uniformity. We use Theorem 3 and show that Φ http ∪ Φ tcp is uniform because Φ http and Φ tcp are positively commutative.
Using Theorem 3 is particulary suitable for proving uniformity of sets of transformations in protocols that belong to different levels of the protocol stack. For example, since TCP is a transformation-level protocol while HTTP is an application-level protocol, TCP specification is indifferent to changes in the HTTP payload and HTTP specification is indifferent to changes in the way TCP transfers the payload. This independency is the basis of the commutativity proof.
The rules in Φ http represent an HTTP attack as a single string while the rules in Φ tcp represent an attack as a TCP sequence (Section 5.1). When we unify Φ http and Φ tcp we must use a single representation for attacks. Hence, we should adjust the definitions of the rules in Φ http to work with multiple TCP segments. Due to space constraints, we discuss this adjustment in Appendix C.
Claim 7. Φ tcp ∪ Φ http is uniform and reversible.
Proof of Claim 7. Notice that all the rules in Φ tcp ∪ Φ http are either shrinking or expanding with respect to the partial order complexity (Definition 7). To show that Φ tcp ∪ Φ http is uniform, we need to show that these sets are set-wise positively commutative (Definition 4). Then, the uniformity of Φ tcp ∪ Φ http follows from Theorem 3.
To show that Φ tcp and Φ http are positively commutative, we show that for every derivation of the form σ Table 3 presents the major cases of all these derivations; other cases are similar and we omit them for brevity.
Modeling Other Transformations
We discuss the uniformity and reversibility of transformations that are not part of our Φ tcp and Φ http .
Modeling other TCP transformations. Header change TCP transformations operate on the header of a TCP segment; for example, they modify the TCP flags [8, 21] . While we do not prove it, we believe that these transformations are uniform because they only involve syntactic manipulation at the TCP level. To prove their uniformity one should first extend the representation of a TCP sequence (Section 5.1) to include a representation for a TCP header. Then, one should extend the definition of complexity, so it will enforce the notion of expanding and shrinking rules.
A Formal Definition of Φ tcp
The formal definition of Φ tcp is given in We use a series of changes to "shift" 
